Inequality, poverty and the privatization of essential services: A "systems of provision" study of water, energy and local buses in the UK by Bayliss, K et al.
This is a repository copy of Inequality, poverty and the privatization of essential services: A
"systems of provision" study of water, energy and local buses in the UK.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/165814/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Bayliss, K, Mattioli, G and Steinberger, J (Accepted: 2020) Inequality, poverty and the 
privatization of essential services: A "systems of provision" study of water, energy and local
buses in the UK. Competition and Change. ISSN 1024-5294 (In Press) 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529420964933
This item is protected by copyright, all rights reserved. This is an author produced version 
of an article accepted for publication in Competition and Change. Uploaded in accordance 
with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
For Peer Review
Inequality, poverty and the privatization of essential 
services: A "systems of provision" study of water, energy 
and local buses in the UK
Journal: Competition & Change
Manuscript ID CCH-20-0026.R2
Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript
Keywords:
privatization, inequality, systems of provision, bus transport, water, 
energy
Abstract:
This paper is concerned with the distributional effects of the deregulation 
and privatisation of essential services in Britain since the 1980s, based 
on a cross-sector study of water, energy and local bus transport. Our 
approach locates end users within the structures and processes, and 
prevailing narratives that underpin both production and consumption. 
This framework highlights the ways that the provisioning of these vital 
services is contested, contradictory and underpinned by power relations. 
We show that, at one end, investors in these sectors have made 
generous returns on their investments but their methods of profit 
maximisation are often not in the public interest. Meanwhile these profits 
are financed by end users payments of bills and fares. Many lower-
income households face challenges in terms of affording, and even 
accessing, these essential services. Regulation has failed to provide 
adequate social protection. We argue that adverse social outcomes 
emerge from systemic factors embedded in these modes of provision. A 
narrative of politically-neutral, technocratic solutions belies the 
underlying contested nature of privatized monopolistic shared essential 
services. Moreover, a policy preoccupation with markets and competition 
obscures the inequality embedded in the underlying structures and 
processes and undermines more collective and equitable forms of 
provisioning. 
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Introduction
Over the past three decades, households in Britain have become revenue streams for global 
finance via their consumption of essential goods and services such as water, energy and 
transport facilities (Meek, 2012; Allen and Pryke, 2013; Loftus et al, 2016). Some low-
income households have suffered disproportionately, in some cases resorting to extreme 
coping mechanisms (such as self-disconnection), and many have failed to be protected by 
social policy. State intervention is dominated by market-oriented ideology, with policies 
centred on increasing competition or creating pseudo-competitive constraints on monopolistic 
providers. We argue that these policies have created adverse social outcomes which result 
from systemic factors embedded in the underlying processes and structures by which 
privatized services are provided. 
In constructing these services in market form, providers and end users have been redefined as 
investors and customers. For consumers, the process of market-making imposes a 
responsibility to manage access and affordability, ostensibly in isolation from the underlying 
production processes. The state has multiple and contradictory roles, charged with both 
protecting the rights of citizens and residents as well as creating an attractive investment 
climate. As we discuss below, a narrative of neutral technocratic solutions belies the 
underlying contested nature of private provision of monopolistic shared essential services, 
and the seemingly technical task of regulation is infused with political judgements. 
Our approach connects investors with end users as part of an integrated system with attention 
to the structures, the core agents and the financial flows as drivers of inequality.  This paper 
begins in the following section with an overview of privatisation in Britain, and the way this 
has developed in practice in each of these sectors. This is followed by three separate sections 
each devoted to a segment of agents in the system: producers, consumers and the state. These 
sections are connected by the theme of the revenue stream. The final section concludes.  
Overall our analysis shows that provisioning systems for these vital services have been 
consistently configured in the interests of producers rather than consumers, and high returns 
to capital at household expense have been tolerated, and even encouraged, for many years. 
For low-income households this can translate into multiple deprivations, as is demonstrated 
in these three essential services. Recent regulatory moves towards tighter controls are not 
embedded in the regulatory process but have emerged in response to political pressure. 
Elsewhere in the economy, a bias towards capital at the expense of households has been 
observed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. For example, the share of GDP allocated to 
labour has fallen (Kohler et al 2018) and the post crisis recovery is regressive (Green and 
Lavery 2015; Dagdeviren et al 2020). This paper contributes to this literature, indicating that 
a similar bias in favour of capital can be found in the ways in which basic needs are met in 
Britain.
 
2 Background: The Systems of Provision approach and privatization in Britain 
Our analysis draws on the Systems of Provision (SoP) approach (Fine et al, 2018) which 
contends that consumption is integrally connected to the ways in which services are provided. 
As such, agents in the chain of provisioning, including consumers and producers as well as 
the state (and sub-groups within these) are assumed to have complex and competing 
priorities, and outcomes are contested. These vertical chains of provision intersect with cross-
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cutting structures and cultures so that each SoP is highly context-specific and influenced by 
the materiality of what is provided. Systems are maintained by prevailing narratives. The 
approach effectively lifts the lid on the social relations which underpin specific consumption 
outcomes (see for example Mattioli et al 2020 on the political economy of car dependence). 
In the context of this paper, the approach provides a systematic framework for analysing the 
complex relations between consumers (or end users) and other agents within the system by 
which essential services are provided. 
INSERT FIG 1 ABOUT HERE
A starting point for the SoP approach is the context within which the system is located. This 
section provides a brief overview of the spread of privatization and its effects in each sector. 
While privatization in different forms has been taken up across the world, the style and reach 
in Britain, originating with the Thatcher Government of the 1980s and 90s, has been more 
extreme than elsewhere. 
In water, upon privatization in 1989, the ten public regional water and sewerage monopolies 
in England and Wales (and some smaller water-only companies) were listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). Wate  in Scotland and Northern Ireland was not privatized. The 
dispersed ownership of the early 90s quickly gave way to consolidation as shareholders built 
their market share. Only three water companies remain listed on the LSE while six are owned 
by private investors and one (Welsh Water) by a not-for-profit company. 
Private water utilities are regulated by a system of periodic price controls, established and 
enforced by the state regulator, Ofwat. Prices are based on anticipated investment costs and 
past performance against targets, set in advance for five-year periods. The regulatory process 
is intended to mimic the market, as private monopolies supposedly become price takers, as 
they would in a competitive market. Notably, the regulator does not intervene in dividend 
payouts or corporate structures, deeming these to be market outcomes. 
Since privatisation, investment and productivity have increased (NAO, 2015; Frontier 
Economics, 2017), but the record on efficiency gains is mixed (Hall and Lobina, 2008; Saal 
and Parker, 2001; Saal et al., 2007). Overall, the performance in England and Wales is not 
significantly better than neighbouring Scotland where water remains in the public sector 
(Helm, 2020; Thomas, 2019). Financial engineering has boosted shareholder payouts 
(Yearwood, 2018; Helm, 2020). England and Wales have among the highest bills compared 
with other European countries (Helm, 2020). 
In energy, the gas and electricity sectors in Great Britain1 have been unbundled, each into 
four constituent parts: generation, transmission, distribution and retail. For electricity this 
happened as part of privatization in the 1990s. For gas, the process took considerably longer 
(Thomas, 2016). Transmission and distribution networks were considered to be monopolistic 
and these were created into private companies initially by listing them on the LSE. All energy 
transmission and distribution networks have since been delisted from the LSE and are 
privately owned. A separate company operates the national grid for both gas and electricity. 
As with water, these monopolistic parts of the energy sectors are regulated by a state 
regulator, Ofgem, via periodic price controls. 
The generation and retail segments, in contrast, were opened up to competition with free 
entry and exit of providers. Since 1999 consumers have been able to choose their retail 
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energy provider. Retail prices in energy were originally subject to price controls but these 
were lifted in the early 2000s (IPPR, 2014). However, the energy market has not operated as 
planned. As Thomas (2019, p.220), puts it: the ideal of a liquid, competitive wholesale 
market feeding into a competitive retail business with consumers choosing the cheapest 
supplier has never been achieved. Despite the introduction of competition, energy retail has 
been dominated by the so-called Big Six vertically integrated incumbent energy 
companies, typically providing both electricity and gas.2 While their market share has fallen 
from 98 percent in 2013 to 80 percent in 2019, still the majority of customers does not switch 
their provider in response to price signals, and there is extensive mistrust of the energy sector 
and retail competition (Thomas, 2019). Meanwhile, gas and electricity in the wholesale 
market is primarily sold via self-dealing within the Big Six or long term confidential 
contracts (Thomas, 2019).
Prior to the Transport Act 1985, local bus provision was regulated, and most of the bus 
industry was owned by (either national or municipal) public companies. The 1985 reforms 
privatised much of the industry and introduced quantity deregulation outside of London. 
This meant that bus companies became free to provide (and withdraw) services as they 
pleased, with little more than formal notice to the Local Authorities. This was intended to 
encourage competition between a multitude of small private operators, with positive effects 
on public transport provision (Banister, 2002; Wolmar, 1999). In contrast, in London a public 
agency (Transport for London) retains strategic control of public transport provision, while 
operations are tendered to private firms. 
While there are disagreements regarding the best model of provision for local bus transport 
(see e.g. Currie, 2016; Mees, 2010; van de Velde and Wallis, 2013), the English deregulated 
approach is widely considered as a failed experiment. Broadly speaking, bus provision in 
England has underperformed comparable systems, both in London and abroad, in terms of 
affordability and supply of services (Campaign for Better Transport, 2019; Preston, 2003), 
deterioration of service provision due to fragmentation effects (OSullivan and Patel, 2014), 
and resulting negative impacts on social inclusion for low-income households (Crisp et al, 
2018). Much of the problem results from the rapid consolidation of the market in the wake of 
privatisation, so that a few operators operate as near monopolists in local areas. 
The privatisation of essential services in Britain went considerably further than elsewhere in 
the world. Only Chile has fully divested its water services. In energy, while retail competition 
has been introduced elsewhere, Bulgaria is the only other country in Europe that has divested 
its networks to foreign owners (ECIU, 2017). In local public transport, the British model of 
quantity deregulation is an outlier among OECD countries (Mattioli et al, 2020; Mees, 
2010). Privatisation and deregulation were part of a programme which evolved incrementally 
in the 1980s with no master plan (Author 1, 2014). The policies were presented as 
mechanisms to bring investment and efficiency through competition building on a narrative 
of poor state performance. While the main public-facing argument was one of better and 
cheaper services for customers, the full agenda was one of private acquisition of state assets. 
However, as we discuss, outcomes are complex and contested. In water, there has been 
extensive investment as intended but this is financed by high-cost debt which feeds through 
to household bills. In energy, competition has been effective in driving down prices for some, 
but this has been financed by those that are less active (and more vulnerable) in the market. 
In bus transport, initial generous provision and price reductions from competition gave way 
to inflated prices and curtailment of uncommercial bus routes, although these had been 
socially valuable. At the same time, private investor profits have soared. Overall, then, the 
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4
case for privatisation and deregulation is far from compelling. As demonstrated in other 
sectors (Bowman et al 2014), privatisation and deregulation can create industries that do not 
serve national welfare interests, for example, with the use of extractive business practices 
such as curtailing investment in order to maximise profits. 
3 Producers: Investors and investment practices
This section examines the investors that own the companies that provide water, energy and 
bus transport.  The section goes on to highlight some of the methods of profit generation (or 
outright profiteering) practiced by these companies. 
3.1 Investors
There has been a marked shift in the type of owners of the monopolistic water utilities and 
energy transmission and distribution networks since the mid-2000s in England and Wales. 
Traditional infrastructure companies (RWE, Vivendi, Suez) have been largely replaced by 
financial investors including pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, global conglomerates 
and private equity investors and investment funds. Some financial investors use intermediary 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) companies set up offshore to buy utilities. The worlds richest 
are represented in the high net worths that contribute to the funds of asset managers, as well 
as the direct shareholders. In some cases the ultimate owners are unknown companies 
registered in the Cayman Islands (Author 1 2014). 
The competitive retail elements attract a different kind of investor. In energy, mostly these 
are listed companies (such as SSE and Centrica which owns British Gas) or subsidiaries of 
companies listed elsewhere (NPower, Scottish Power and Eon).  Investors also include state 
subsidiaries of foreign governments such as EdF Electricity which is owned by the 
Government of France. 
For bus companies, rather than de-listing from the LSE, ownership structure travelled in the 
opposite direction as small-scale private owners, which emerged in the aftermath of the 1985 
reforms, expanded before launching on the LSE. Local bus provision is now dominated by a 
small number of large operators, which are often de facto monopolists in local areas 
(Competition Commission 2011). In 2015/16, three companies, Stagecoach, FirstGroup and 
Arriva accounted for more than half of all bus journeys in England (excluding London) (DfT, 
2016). These companies are listed on the LSE, and financial investors are strongly 
represented among shareholders. Also, the German Government has a stake in Arriva via 
Deutsche Bahn. Deregulation has generated extreme wealth for some. The founders of 
Stagecoach, Brian Souter and Ann Gloag, share 11th place in the Scottish Rich List with net 
worth of £920m each (Brinded and Colson, 2017). 
3.2 From business opportunity to exploitation
Investors have boosted shareholder revenues through diverse means unrelated to productivity. 
In water, investment has been debt-financed and almost all post-tax profit was taken out as 
dividends over the decade to 2016 [INSERT FIG 2 ABOUT HERE]. Private equity-owned 
water utilities have securitised future water bills to increase company debts. The increased 
debt has been used not just to finance investments but also to pay special dividends and to 
refinance so that the acquisition debt (i.e. the cost that the investors incurred to buy the 
utility) is allocated to the regulated utility and financed by consumers (Author 1, 2014). 
These companies pay little tax (Bayliss and Hall, 2017). However, the full nature of financial 
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engineering is obscured by the complex water-related financial products and instruments that 
have been devised to boost extractions as well as opaque corporate structures (Loftus et al, 
2016; Pryke and Allen, 2019). Thames Water has been particularly aggressive in its financing 
structures. Customer bills were securitised for a 50-year period, up to 2062 (Allen and Pryke, 
2013) so bill payments will, for decades, be paying off debts used in part to finance dividends 
paid in the 2000s and 2010s. Such transactions escape regulatory control as capital structures 
and dividend payouts are deemed by the regulator to be market outcomes. 
Similar high returns have been observed in the regulated energy networks where prices are 
higher than necessary (Helm, 2017). Research by the ECIU (2017) found that the distribution 
network operators reported net profit margins in the range of 25 to 39 percent per annum. 
They calculate that the average dividend payout was 15 percent of turnover, equivalent to £13 
of the average domestic bill (ECIU, 2017). Research for Citizens Advice Bureau also found 
that consumers were over-paying for distribution networks by £7.5bn a year (Wild, 2017). 
These high returns have in part been attributed to lenient regulation which, for example, has 
been generous in its estimates of the risk levels companies face (Wild, 2017). 
In competitive areas, energy firms have taken advantage of the least proactive customers. A 
2015 investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA, 2016) found that 
domestic energy price increases for the Big Six created a detriment (i.e. the value of 
overcharging) to domestic customers of around £1.4bn a year. Higher prices were charged to 
the 70 percent of consumers that had not moved to cheaper tariffs (Waddams Price, 2018), 
although the details of the calculations are disputed (Littlechild, 2017),
In addition, all of the Big Six have been fined since 2013 for mis-selling, i.e. trying to 
attract new customers with misleading information or for poor customer service. Ofgem has 
continued to fine companies for these offences at regular intervals since retail competition 
was introduced nearly twenty years ago. In December 2015 Ofgem imposed its largest fine to 
date of £26m on Npower for failing to treat customers fairly (Ofgem, 2015) in their billing 
and complaints handling. Rather than indicative of regulatory enforcement, Thomas (2016, 
p.46) suggests that, as this was the eleventh fine imposed on the Big Six in five years for 
similar violations, it is indicative of Ofgems impotence with regard to effecting behavioural 
change [in producers].  
In bus transport, competition was intended to lower prices and improve services. However, 
an initial phase  known as the bus wars  characterised by overprovision and fierce 
competition between operators, was followed by rapid market consolidation. Larger 
companies were able to undercut competitors with low, loss-making fares. Some 34 years 
after privatization, the bus market is characterised by strong barriers to entry because of the 
economies of scale from which the big players now benefit (Competition Commission, 
2011). Large companies use cross-subsidies to drive smaller competitors out of business but 
not to sustain unprofitable routes for social purposes (Wolmar, 1999). 
Thus, in each of these sectors firms have boosted profits via aggressive and innovative 
practices unrelated to production. Crucial local services have become cogs of investment 
wealth generators, subject to decision-making to meet commercial priorities established in 
distant head offices, segregated from local authority control. In return for high dividend 
payouts, directors earn high salaries, over £2m in some cases (Author 1, 2014) also financed 
by consumers. These examples of regular practices of rent extraction, translate into systemic 
upward pressure on prices and downward pressure on standards across this combination of 
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essential services, combined with a collective failure of the state to protect end users, 
discussed further below. 
4 Consumers
Since the financial crisis, the socio-economic climate in the UK has been dominated by a 
regressive recovery. Government policy has been directly supportive of returns to asset 
holders, promoting corporate profitability at the same time as cuts in welfare and an increase 
in precarious and low paid employment have penalized low and middle-income wage earners 
(Green and Lavery, 2015). Austerity Britain has led to intense hardship for a growing number 
of households affecting key aspects of everyday life. Indebtedness is on the increase for low-
income households, not for indulging in luxuries but simply in order to pay for essential 
needs, such as food, shelter and key services. Many of these households face difficulties 
meeting payments across all essential expenditures (Dagdeviren et al, 2020). Policy 
narratives have shifted the responsibility to individuals for managing the affordability of 
basic services, masking the structural and systemic causes of increasing deprivation, such as 
the changes in the labour market, and the welfare system (Dagdeviren et al, 2020). Similarly, 
access to services is framed in terms of the actions of the individual user with little attention 
to the social relations and structures that underpin the system by which services are provided. 
As in other sectors, state policy is blinkered by imaginaries of markets and competition 
(Bowman et al, 2014).   
4.1 Affordability 
While there is no official definition of water poverty there are clear indicators that many 
struggle to pay their bills.3  Water bills increased by around 40 percent (after inflation) on 
average following privatization but have plateaued since 2000 (Author 1, 2014). However, 
affordability has declined due to falling in real wages in the wake of the financial crisis 
(Dagdeviren et al, 2020). Almost a quarter of households in England has difficulty paying 
their water bills (Ofwat, 2015). This translates into real difficulties for the poorest 
households. The proportion of calls to National Debtline relating to water debt increased 
from four percent in 2008 to 16 percent in 2018 (Money Advice Trust, 2018). 
The extractive practices of producers put upward pressure on prices. For the nine Water and 
Sewerage Companies in England, interest charged increased from £288m to over £2bn in the 
twenty years from 1993 to 2012 (in 2012 prices) as debt levels rose. In the 2010-2015 period 
around 27 percent of the average bill went to return on capital (i.e. interest and dividend 
payments) (Author 1, 2014), all of which is funded by bill payers. In London, an additional 
separate investment, Thames Tideway, a massive sewerage development, was ultimately 
funded by an additional levy on Thames Water consumers. This arrangement was needed in 
part because of Thamess high existing debt levels (Loftus and March, 2019). 
Energy bills are among the most significant expenses for households. In 2016 energy costs 
accounted on average for around 8.4 percent of household income for those in the lowest 
decile compared four percent for all households (Money Advice Trust, 2018). Overall bills in 
2017 were 39 percent higher in real terms than bills in 2001 (Money Advice Trust, 2018). 
Many struggle to pay. The proportion of calls to National Debtline that related to energy debt 
problems increased from nine percent in 2008 to 17 percent in 2017 (Money Advice Trust, 
2018). In England, 2.5 million households (11 percent) were classified as being in fuel 
poverty in 2016 (BEIS, 2018).4 
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The past decade has seen a fall in the number of energy customers that are behind on their 
bills and rates of disconnection for non-payment have fallen (Money Advice Trust, 2018). 
However, the proportion of customers on energy prepayment meters has doubled from seven 
percent in 1996 to 16 percent in 2015 (CMA, 2016). When a customer runs into financial 
difficulty, the supplier can obtain a warrant to force installation of a prepayment meter and 
customers are often required to pay for the warrant process, further exacerbating their debt 
(Ofgem, 2018). For years, those on prepaid meters were charged a higher tariff than other 
consumers until a cap on prices was introduced in 2017 (see below). However prepaid 
customers are still penalised because they do not have access to the cheapest tariffs available. 
In bus transport, deregulation has been linked to significant fare increases (Banister, 2002; 
Preston and Almutairi, 2013) and the real cost of public transport has increased more rapidly 
than other items of expenditure since the 1990s. [ INSERT FIG 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Deregulation is associated with a reduction in bus travel in part because companies find it 
more profitable to cut peripheral services leaving many areas with a patchwork quilt of 
zones where operators may be operating in near-monopolistic conditions (Crisp et al, 2018, 
p.52). Furthermore, bus routes are fragmented and uncoordinated with other transport 
operators (OSullivan and Patel, 2004). As Mees (2010) argues, in a competitive market there 
is no incentive for operators to implement cross-subsidies or coordinate between different 
modes, routes and operations. Deregulation, then, provides incentives to boost financial 
returns by reducing or eliminating more peripheral services while concentrating on core 
corridors (Crisp et al 2018, p.53). This penalises those travelling for reasons other than 
commuting, as well as commuters with shift patterns in the flexible economy and / or needing 
access to outlying business parks (as many low-income workers do). Overall, this results in 
greater car dependence, discussed below. 
4.2 Responsibility as the customers burden
With these sectors depicted as markets rather than social or public services, there is 
increasing emphasis on the savvy consumer to be responsible for their own welfare. In the 
water and energy sectors, the ethos of the market imposes specific behaviours. These services 
have become commodities, requiring the user to act as a rational, utility-maximizing, fully 
informed shopper  in line with the mainstream economic caricature of homo economicus 
(Raworth 2017). In the energy sector the consumer is required to seek out the best deal 
from a complex array of tariffs. However, as mentioned, the majority of the population does 
not change their supplier regularly. The combination of impenetrable information, search 
costs, inertia, uncertainty and the potential short term of the financial gain mean that not 
changing tariff could be seen as an entirely rational consumer response (Antal, 2020; Costa et 
al, 2016). 
Lower-income households are penalised by the structures of the energy retail "market. 
Those that switch tend to be from higher social grades, have higher incomes, be younger, pay 
their bills by direct debit and are owner-occupiers or private renters (Ofgem, 2017). Those 
who are highly disengaged are more likely to be from a lower social grade, to rent social 
housing, to be non-white and not to speak English as a first language (Ofgem, 2016). 
Households with limited resources disproportionately avoid behaviours which might upset 
their tight financial control, such as switching providers or payment methods or moving to 
electronic rather than paper billing (Davies et al, 2016). Many on low incomes are effectively 
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8
excluded from the market due to poor credit history, a lack of access to information and being 
on prepaid meters (Middlemiss and Gillard, 2015). 
In water, metering is seen as an important element in reducing demand to achieve 
environmental objectives (DEFRA, 2019) and new technology such as the introduction of 
smart meters in water and energy are promoted as providing greater control of consumption. 
These provide data and have inspired nudge style practices for example with displays to 
compare with consumption of other households. However, there are concerns that vulnerable 
customers are least likely to be able to take advantage of improvements (Waddams Price 
2018). In addition, meters play a role in creating new financial subjectivities within the 
home characterized by disciplined responsible behaviours to ensure a continued revenue 
stream to the financialised entities that depend on them (Loftus et al 2016, p.329). 
Where consumption is metered, firms are paid according to units consumed, and therefore 
benefit from high consumption levels. Yet demand reduction is essential for sustainability in 
our water-stressed future. This potential impasse has been overcome by setting demand 
reduction as a performance target for companies (Ofwat, 2019). Thus, if per capita water 
consumption falls in a specified price review period, the company will be rewarded with a 
higher price increase in the subsequent price review period. For the consumer, reducing 
consumption will only save money in the short term and in the end is charged more for 
consuming less. 
While we observe a clear narrative of customer self-responsibilisation in the energy and 
water sectors, the situation is different for buses. Here reduced bus provision tends to result in 
greater car dependence for low-income households. For these households, the consumer 
choice is often equivalent to a "choice" between severe social exclusion and the enforced 
reliance on a durable good that is expensive to purchase and to run, discussed below. 
4.3 Coping mechanisms
In the three sectors, consumers deploy coping strategies to deal with high costs and/or 
reduced services. These include indebtment, self-rationing of consumption, and the shift to 
other systems of provision, all of which have clear negative consequences for social 
inclusion. In water, households cannot be disconnected for non-payment of bills. However, 
water debts are rising and arrears on water bills is the most common type of debt for low-
income households (JRF, 2018). 
While formal disconnection for non-payment of energy bills has fallen, customers on 
prepayment meters in financial difficulty are known to self-ration. Ofgem (2018) cites 
research from the Citizens Advice Bureau, which estimates that 16 percent of prepayment 
customers (some 600,000 households) self-disconnect at least once per year by not topping 
up their meter. Of these, 50 percent included someone with a mental health condition, 33 
percent had a young child and 87 percent were in receipt of benefits. Severe self-rationing 
can cause or exacerbate existing health problems, with potentially devastating results. 
Research suggests that over 9,600 frail and vulnerable were dying in the winter months due 
to cold homes (NEA, 2017). Qualitative research in the North of England has found that 
some of the poorest households have literally disconnected the gas supply from their house in 
order to avoid paying a standing charge and, as a result, have no access to heating.5
The downward trajectory of local bus transport outside of Greater London since 1985 has 
arguably contributed to increasing car dependence and an increase in the incidence of forced 
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car ownership, where low-income households are effectively forced to own and operate 
cars, despite their substantial cost, because of the lack of practicable alternatives (Currie and 
Senbergs, 2007; Author 2, 2017). The number of cars per household in England increased 
from 0.82 in 1985 to 1.22 in 2017 (DfT, undated), while the percentage of the UK population 
agreeing that the car is a necessity that adults should not have to do without doubled 
between 1983 (22 percent) and 44 percent (2012) (Mack et al, 2013). 
Research indicates that seven percent of UK households (12 percent in the lowest income 
quintile) own cars despite being in material deprivation (i.e. not being able to afford at least 
three necessities), and can thus be described as forced car owners (Author 2, 2017). These 
households typically have high levels of debt, and suffer from fuel poverty within the home, 
which may be the result of high expenditure on car ownership, and use leading them to curtail 
other areas of expenditure. They are also likely to be particularly vulnerable to increases in 
the price of motor fuel, which has been volatile in recent years (Figure 3). Furthermore, there 
is evidence that households with low incomes and high motoring costs are unable to reduce 
their car use when fuel prices go up, with resulting economic stress (Mattioli et al, 2018b). 
The widening and deepening of the private sector across essential services represents a major 
reconfiguration of the relations between households, private capital and the state. Market 
rhetoric suggests that individuals have agency but this is restricted by the ways that services 
are provided, and, in some cases, coping mechanisms are leading to (self) exclusion from 
services. While there is a superficial appearance of individual autonomy, options are 
narrowed by the structures of the SoP which are conditioned by producers and the state. This 
section shows that the situations of households, struggling under welfare and labour policies, 
are exacerbated by the privatised and financialised provisioning of essential services which 
have been structured to benefit global private capital. Thus, it is not just that affordability is 
impinged by lower income levels, but the bills themselves are boosted by profiteering 
practices, and routes out of poverty are blocked by cuts to transport services that are not 
commercially viable. 
5 Role of the state 
The state consists of many different agencies, from the political party through to civil 
servants. These may have different, conflicting objectives and influence in policy and 
practice. Ultimately the state has a responsibility for ensuring that essential needs are met. 
Yet wider narratives of private provision, combined with cuts to local government funds have 
left major gaps. As the UN Rapporteur for Extreme Poverty writes, following his visit to the 
UK in 2018 (Alston, 2018, p. 11): 
Abandoning people to the private market in relation to services that affect every 
dimension of their basic well-being, without guaranteeing their access to minimum 
standards, is incompatible with human rights requirements. 
This section considers the ways in which the state intervenes to address social outcomes. 
5.1 Social Policy
The state has established social policies in each of these sectors. In water, the WaterSure 
tariff caps water bills for low income families with more than three children or with a 
medical condition which requires significant use of water. In addition, water companies are 
required to set up social tariffs for disadvantaged consumers. There are certain restrictions to 
this. The tariff has to be cost-neutral, meaning that the revenue that a company loses by 
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offering a social tariff must be balanced elsewhere, for example by a decline in debt recovery 
costs (Ofwat, 2011, p.4). In addition, since the social tariff is funded by other residential bill 
payers (non-household customers do not contribute to the social tariff), the subsidy to 
disadvantaged households must be acceptable to the customers paying for it (DEFRA, 2012). 
Households are consulted about their views on suitable beneficiaries and appropriate levels of 
social tariffs, which inevitably draws judgements about deserving and undeserving poor 
(Author 1, 2017). Social policy in water, then, is oriented around the business impact of non-
payment. The social tariff is associated with a specific understanding of fairness which is 
more akin to charity, and infused with morality, rather than progressive redistribution.
In energy, there are a number of social initiatives. There is some support for vulnerable 
customers, for example with the Priority Services Register (PSR) and the Under the Warm 
Homes Discount.6 Winter Fuel Payments are available for older customers but is not means 
tested. These measures ensure security of supply and improve affordability for some 
customers although there are concerns that some measures are poorly targeted (Boardman, 
2010; Hills, 2012; Preston et al, 2013).
In bus transport, with the 1985 reform, local government retained the power to subsidise 
unprofitable services that are deemed socially necessary. The national government also 
subsidises bus use through the Bus Service Operators Grant (a fuel duty rebate) and the 
concessionary travel scheme, whereby disabled persons and people of pensionable age 
have a right to free off-peak travel. This intervention, as with energy social policy, is poorly 
targeted (Mattioli et al, 2018a; Shaw and Docherty, 2014; Titheridge et al, 2014; Crisp et al, 
2018). Both of these measures benefit older people (regardless of need), while other 
disadvantaged categories (e.g. the unemployed) receive little or no assistance. In addition, 
where social tariffs are funded by taxpayers, these can be seen as a public subsidy to profit-
making private operators, and a bad investment for the public purse (HoC, 2018; Preston, 
2003; Mees, 2010). Bus operating revenue coming from concessionary bus fare 
reimbursement rose from £0.63bn to £1bn between 2004/05 and 2017/18. This is due to 
wider coverage, as the scheme moved from a local authority to a national scheme, increased 
eligibility and a larger proportion of elderly in the wider population (DfT Bus Statistics, 
2017/18). According to some estimates, concessionary bus passes account for 45 percent of 
bus operators revenues (HoC, 2018, p.22). 
Across each of these sectors, the levels of social tariff is far from sufficient. At the end of 
2017/18 the number of customers receiving support through water company social tariffs 
came to just 393,143 while a further 158,454 were on the Governments WaterSure 
programme. This amounts to around just over 2 percent of customers, far fewer than the 5.6m 
that find their bills unaffordable (Money Advice Trust, 2018; CCW, 2018). In energy, the 
social provision is woefully inadequate in view of the levels of deprivation demonstrated by 
the extent self-rationing and self-disconnection, above. In bus transport, deregulation 
provided the occasion for a large reduction of direct public subsidies for the provision of non-
profitable routes in 1980s and 1990s (Preston, 2003). Mostly as a result of austerity policies, 
local authority spending on supporting buses has fallen again by 43 percent in real terms 
between 2009/2010 and 2018/2019 (Campaign for Better Transport, 2019). This has resulted 
in over 3,000 local authority supported bus services being cut or reduced between 2009 and 
2019 (Campaign for Better Transport, 2019), with dramatic impacts on accessibility for 
households without cars, notably in rural areas (Bawden, 2018).
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The scope for social provision is diminished due to cherry-picking by investors. When 
private companies close rural bus routes that are not commercially viable, these are left to the 
state to provide, but without the scope for cross subsidy from more lucrative areas of activity 
which remain with the private sector. Strategic bodies such as local authorities have very 
limited powers to set or oversee key aspects of the public transport system. Local authorities 
can tender bus services where private operators alone do not run them but these tend to be 
poorly integrated with commercial services (Crisp et al, 2018). Indeed, councils need to seek 
alternative funding sources for rural bus services such as through levies on new housing 
developments (Smith, 2018).
Viewed through the SoP lens, these measures are effectively tweaking around the edges of a 
system that is structured in favour of investors. While these measures may lead to some small 
improvements for some consumer groups, the extractive methods of provisioning by 
producers are largely unchallenged. Conceiving of these sectors as markets reduces scope for 
more progressive and collectivist financing mechanisms. 
5.2 Regulation: contestation and conflict
Regulation in water and energy has become increasingly complex and is something of a 
moving target (Allen and Pryke, 2013, p. 426). Increased complexity increases the scope 
for regulatory capture. Each water sector price review has added roughly two new regulatory 
mechanisms to the process (Helm, 2020). In energy, critics have highlighted a narrow 
technocratic approach to policy, att nding more to delivering markets rather than energy 
specific goals (Kuzemko, 2016; Thomas, 2019).  
The state, via the regulator, is required to mediate between the conflicting interests of 
consumers, investors and voters. In the water sector, for example, Ofwat is called upon, on 
the one hand, to set conditions that will facilitate low-cost investment (DEFRA, 2019, p.3). 
On the other hand the regulator has faced criticisms due to the high returns made by 
investors. Tighter price controls are proposed for the 2020-2025 Price Review period. But 
this action by the regulator resulted in the down grading of the credit ratings of highly geared 
companies (Moodys, 2018) which risks increasing financing costs for companies. The 
regulator has to navigate these conflicting pressures. 
Price-setting inevitably involves winners and losers. For some years, the overall regulatory 
climate in Britain has been remarkably supportive of private investors. According to the 
Chief Executive of Ofwat over the past twenty years, the direction of error has been 
consistently in favour of companies rather than customers (Ofwat 2017, p.2). Furthermore, 
the regulators consistent over-estimation of financing and taxation costs led to windfall gains 
for water companies of at least £1.2bn between 2010 and 2015 (HoC, 2016). The effects of 
the securitization of water bills escaped regulatory scrutiny (Allen and Pryke, 2013) until it 
reached the media and the attention of politicians (Gove, 2018). As with water, shareholder 
returns in energy have been boosted by biases in assumptions made by the regulator which 
has consistently over-estimated the level of risk that investors face, resulting in higher bills 
for customers (Wild, 2018). 
Conventional narratives of regulation underestimate the weight of investor interests as 
compared with those of consumers. Powerful corporate interests have been successful in 
steering interventions in the interests of investors. In bus transport the problems of 
fragmentation of services are well known, and reforms have been debated since the mid-
1990s. Yet private operators have fiercely opposed attempts to re-regulate the market. The 
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profits generated from operating in Londons publicly controlled tendering system (see 
below), are much lower than in the deregulated environment in the rest of Great Britain 
(Figure 4  see also Knowles and Abrantes, 2008; Wolmar 1999). 
INSERT FIG 4 ABOUT HERE 
Privatization and deregulation create powerful incumbents, which benefit from the status quo 
and oppose attempts to re-regulate the sector. This form of lock-in means that these reforms, 
once enacted, are much more difficult to reverse. 
While official policy is strongly wedded to the ethic of competition and markets, the state 
continues to play a strong role, and this has been expanding in some areas. In the energy 
sector, following the evidence of overcharging in the CMA review, the government took the 
radical step of imposing a cap on retail prices. Initially this was just for those on prepaid 
meters, but was then extended to all customers on default standard variable tariffs from 
winter 2018/19 (Ofgem, 2018). Critics point out the limitations of this in terms of social 
policy. For example, there is nothing to stop firms overcharging in other ways (such as on 
existing arrears) (Hannah, 2017). Furthermore, for customers on low levels of energy 
consumption facing affordability constraints, the cap is not going to make much difference 
(CAP, 2018). And these price caps are temporary and will last no longer than 2023 (BEIS, 
2018, p.21). But this is a remarkable increase in state intervention, and is effectively 
recognition of the failure of private competition to meet social needs. 
5.3 Competitive tendering in the bus transport sector
In contrast to the rest of Britain, bus and other public transport in London is coordinated by 
public agencies (Buehler and Pucher, 2011; Buehler et al, 2018; Koch and Newmark, 2016). 
London bus routes are established under coordinated public planning and then tendered to 
private companies by a public agency, TfL, which retains control of the strategic and tactical 
aspects of public transport provision (Mees, 2010). The simultaneous introduction of 
competitive tendering in London, and of the more radical deregulation in the rest of England, 
provides a natural experiment of sorts on the impacts of different models of public transport 
provision. The results could not be clearer: while bus travel per capita has rapidly increased 
in London between 1990 and 2010, it has declined in the rest of Great Britain, notably in 
other metropolitan areas (Figure 5). Meanwhile, bus companies extract lower profits from the 
London market than in the rest of the country (see above).
INSERT FIG 5 ABOUT HERE
Other cities are seeking to follow the example set by London. The newly introduced Bus 
Services Act (DfT, 2017) enables Mayoral Combined Authorities (i.e. eight major city-
regions in England) to re-regulate the sector and be provided with equivalent powers to 
those available in London (p.4). To date, only Greater Manchester has initiated the complex 
legal process required for re-regulation (GMCA, 2019), and is facing the opposition of 
private bus operators, which have threatened legal action. It is widely expected that other 
city-regions will follow suit if Greater Manchesters attempt is successful (Bounds, 2019). 
The case of TfL suggests that if the engagement of the private sector in public transport 
provision was relegated to the level of private tendering for planned and regulated provision, 
then some of the adverse effects of deregulation could be mitigated.
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6 Conclusion
This paper applies the SoP approach to the water, energy and bus sectors in the UK, 
connecting end users with the underlying systems by which these services are provided. The 
analysis reveals how consumers, as they meet their basic needs, are unwittingly moulded to 
meet the imperatives of investors, representing global capital. The state, tasked with 
mediating between the two, has tended to side with investors. Consumers have no alternative 
but to comply as best as possible. However, in some cases, those that cannot fulfil the 
revenue requirements are disconnected from vital services, and may suffer severe deprivation 
while they appear to quietly peel away. On paper, excessive profiteering should be curbed by 
competition and / or by regulatory intervention. But, as Bowman et al (2014, p.11) point out 
markets and the actors within them never work quite as expected and unintended negative 
social consequences proliferate. 
An important question is why these outcomes occur and why the regulator does not intervene 
further to protect poor households. The SoP analysis suggests that this is due to a 
combination of factors. First there is an inevitable trade-off inherent in balancing the 
contested interests of stakeholders, and the balance has tipped in favour of investors. Second, 
there is a strong ideological commitment to market-led solutions, with narratives framed in 
terms of efficiency and competition rather than equity and public service. Hence, policy is 
focused on market-making. Third, with these sectors understood as markets, consumers can 
be treated separately from the underlying biased structures by which services are provided, 
and the inequality inherent in the system goes unnoticed. Finally, these distributional 
outcomes are below the radar for the majority of the population and there is little political 
pressure to challenge the existing structures. Opinion polls showed considerable support for 
the public ownership of essential services in the 2019 national election, but the opposition 
(Labour) party was defeated on other issues and the window for nationalisation has all but 
closed (Hall, 2020). While there are debates around the details of regulation, there has been 
little significant challenge to the structures created by privatised modes of service provision. 
The SoP framing suggests that the market narrative presents a convenient screen for rent 
extraction. Thus, social policy is framed in terms of individual affordability and consumer 
choices, while the inequalities in the underlying SoP are ignored. In water for example, social 
policy is reduced to small cross subsidies between households while the millions paid to 
directors and billions paid to shareholders are considered to be the work of the market. 
Similarly, the closure of unprofitable bus routes is seen as a market, rather than a social 
outcome. Policy is dominated by an intense preoccupation with superficially technocratic 
interventions. Continuing to see these sectors as markets, and consumers as utility-
maximising individuals, occludes more collectivist responses (Van der Zwan, 2014, p.113).
The couching of these structural shifts in terms of market narratives has echoes of austerity 
more generally. Policy responses to the financial crisis have been associated with a narrative 
of greater moralism, blaming individual responsibility rather than private profiteering. For 
example, a lack of financial literacy is blamed for increased indebtedness. Dagdeviren, et al 
(2020) and Green and Lavery (2015) also point to the entrenchment of an ethos of moralistic 
disciplining, for example, in workfarism. Van der Zwan (2014, p.112) points out that the 
financialisation of the everyday has been facilitated by discourses of risk-taking, self-
management and self-fulfillment  individuals today encounter a world of risk in which they 
themselves are responsible for dealing with the uncertainties of life. Similar discourses 
prevail in water and energy, where the individual is responsible for the affordability of, and 
access to, essential services. 
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Conceiving of such outcomes as market failure suggests that a more market-like structure 
offers the solution, but this approach has consistently failed to benefit low-income 
households, while revenue flows to shareholders continue. The result has been a sustained 
and systemic structural assault on households in general, and low-income households in 
particular, across essential services. As Meek pointed out in 2012 (p.1), the privatisations 
are joining up. In the same way that the state has developed a punitive and precarious 
system of welfare provision for low-income households facing choices between debt and 
hunger (Dagdeviren et al, 2020), privatisation and deregulation have also penalised low-
income households. These are the ones that are forced on to prepayment meters for energy, 
that pay over five percent of their household income in water bills, who face poor 
connectivity from public transport services with resulting car dependence. In the provision of 
essential services, as elsewhere, the state has orchestrated the transformation of the political 
economy of Britain, channelling funds into privileged sectors while imposing deflation on 
others (Green and Lavery, 2015). 
Policy responses to poverty and inequality tend to focus on fiscal measures such as tax and 
welfare, or educating and even punishing poor households, as though their poverty were the 
outcome of lack of information or bad behaviour. However, this paper reveals that in Britain, 
inequality is built into the fabric of everyday life, emerging from the way in which basic 
needs are met. Regulation has not been able to provide social protection. Rather, in order to 
address these highly inequitable social outcomes, attention is needed to the underlying 
structures and processes of the SoP. The current policy narrative of markets and competition 
needs to be replaced with one of equitable and universal provision.
1 Energy was also privatised in Northern Ireland but has a separate structure and is not addressed here. 
2 The Big Six energy companies are British Gas, npower, EDF Energy, E,On, Scottish Power and SSE
3 The NEA (2019) recommends that water poverty is defined as where a household spends more than 
3% of household income (after housing and childcare costs) on their combined water and sewerage 
bill(s). 
4 According to the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act (2000) a person is in fuel poverty if 
they are on a lower income in a home which cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost.
5 Personal Communication, Lucie Middlemiss, Associate Professor, University of Leeds. 
6 The threshold is being reduced to 150,000 customers by 2021. 
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Figure 1: Schematic depicting the agents and relations studied through Systems of Provision 
(SoP).
Figure 2: Dividends and Post tax profits for Englands water and sewerage companies (2007-
2016)
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Figure 3: ONS CPI index for different items of expenditure 1996-2017.
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Figure 4: Operating profit margins of two major bus operators in the regulated and deregulated 
markets in the UK in 2018 
Source: StageCoach (2018, p.2), Go-Ahead (2018, p.38).
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Figure 5: Passenger journeys on local bus services by metropolitan area status and country per 
head of population 1991-2017
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
London English metropolitan areas English non-metropolitan areas
England Scotland Wales
Great Britain England outside London
Source: DfT Bus Statistics Table BUS0103. 
Page 24 of 25
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cach
Competition & Change
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
4
Page 25 of 25
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cach
Competition & Change
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
